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Bonapartism in The United Kingdom: 
From Thatcher via Blair to Brexit 
 
My essay identifies two Bonapartist moments in post-war Britain in the context of the 
economic crises of the late 1960s and 1970s and the continuing structural crisis of the 
British state. These are the Thatcherite (1979-90) and Blair (1997-2007) moments. It 
contrasts these periods with the current situation, which is one of a catastrophic 
equilibrium with Brexit filling the symbolic role of Bonaparte as a promise of salvation 
from a growing organic crisis but that, materially, merely serves to deepen that crisis. 
 
Marx and Gramsci on Bonapartism 
 
The Eighteenth Brumaire provides a model for how to analyse conjunctures, the 
specificity and effectivity of political struggles, and disjunctions between political forces 
and economic classes. It also illustrates the role of the political identities, political 
discourses, and political forms of representation through which the class content of 
politics comes to be represented or, indeed, misrepresented. As a substantive 
exercise in historiography, the text offers a periodization of Louis Bonaparte's coup 
d'état on 2nd December 1851 based mainly on movements in parliamentary and party 
politics and the state apparatus as influenced by actions and events occurring at a 
distance from the state. Marx based this periodization on his observation of (1) the 
political scene [politische Bühne], i.e., the visible but nonetheless »imaginary« world 
of everyday politics as acted out before the general public through the open and 
declared action of more or less well organized social forces (Poulantzas 1980: 247-9), 
which, far from being a simple political reflection of economic interests, has its own 
logic and influence on class relations; (2) the social content of the politics acted out on 
this stage, which involves a closer inspection of 'die rauhen Außenwelt’ (18B: S. 173) 
based on looking 'hinter den Kulissen’ (18B: S. 140) of the 'oberflächliche Schein, der 
den Klassenkampf und die eigentümliche Physiognomie dieser Periode verschleiert’ 
(18B: S. 138); (3) changes in the institutional architecture of the state and its 
articulation to the wider public sphere -- electoral, parliamentary, presidential, 
bureaucratic, administrative, military, state-orchestrated mob violence, etc. -- that 
directly condition struggles on the political stage, shaping particular strategies and 
tactics in wars of position and/or manoeuvre, including efforts to modify the state itself, 
and (4) the interconnected movements of the local, national, and international 
economy over different time scales insofar as these provide the social or material 
conditions of political struggles and shape the horizons of political struggle. These four 
closely interwoven theoretical objects guided a double periodization – of the 
transformation of the state and the evolution of the political scene. Marx divided the 
latter into three Hauptperioden in the Bonapartist regime, their sub-periods (or 
phases), and their links with successive steps in political class struggle (18B: S. 120). 
He discussed these issues in terms of their immediate conjunctural significance, the 
primary institutional site in and around which the political drama unfolds, and, as far 
as it was already publicly known, or Marx deemed it knowable, its future significance. 
 
Gramsci drew on the spirit rather than letter of Der Achtzehnte Brumaire to develop a 
more flexible analysis of exceptional regimes that was adapted to the entry of the 
popular masses into politics after the 1870s and the development of the stato allargato 
(erweiterter Staat) in the 1920s and 1930s (Cospito 2016: 211-16; Buci-Glucksmann 
1981: Kapitel 14; Jessop 2007). His Gefängnishefte elaborated increasingly refined 
analyses of specific historical situations based on careful reading of the conjuncture, 
shifting balance of forces, and offensive and defensive steps in class struggle. He 
conceived the state ‘as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable 
equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and 
those of the subordinate groups’ (Q13§17, S. 1584). He also emphasized the 
importance of taking error into account as well as the ‘fact that many political acts are 
due to internal necessities of an organizational character; in other words, they are tied 
to the need to give coherence to a party, a group, or a society’ (Q7, §24, S. 872). Like 
Marx, he stressed the scope for disjunctures between the economic structure and 
events on the political scene and rejected the temptation to explain political 
developments in terms of direct causal links to economic developments. 
 
Historical Context and Conjunctural Shifts that Shaped Bonapartist Moments 
 
The broad economic context domestically for the two distinct Bonapartist moments 
separated by phases of normalization, namely, Thatcherism and New Labour, was a 
protracted crisis of Britain’s flawed post-war Fordist economy and its insertion into the 
circuits of Atlantic Fordism and the world market. This crisis intensified from the mid-
1960s onwards. Politically it was associated with crises in the state form and state 
strategies. Growth in other post-war capitalist economies had been secured in dirigiste 
regimes, corporatist regimes, and liberal regimes (vgl. Shonfield 1968). The British 
state lacked the capacities to engage in statist intervention, effective corporatist 
coordination, or a consistently rigorous laissez-faire line. Its interventions therefore 
oscillated uneasily among the three strategies that all failed in their own ways in 
different conjunctures (Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley, and Ling 1988). This structural and 
strategic crisis fuelled an organic crisis of the wider social formation. It also provided 
the context for the rise of Thatcherism as a neoliberal and neoconservative project 
with an authoritarian populist appeal and authoritarian statist tendencies. 
 
The Periodization of Thatcherism 
 
Thatcherism refers to ‘[t]he development and specificity of the emergent strategic line 
pursued by Thatcher and her various circles of political and ideological supporters’ 
(Jessop et al., 1988: 8). Developing a strategic line involves selecting and ordering 
objectives; deciding on a pattern and sequence of actions deemed appropriate to 
attaining them; monitoring performance and progress; and adjusting tactics and 
objectives as the conjuncture changes. It does not imply logical consistency taken out 
of time and place, let alone an absence of political miscalculation. The Iron Lady was 
the charismatic figurehead who promoted a break with the post-war ‘one-nation’ 
conservatism that supported the Keynesian welfare national state, with its commitment 
to jobs for all and social democracy. But she did not break fundamentally with the 
power bloc or its social bases of support, notably those in southern England. On the 
contrary, the ‘point of no return’ in the rise of Thatcherism coincided with a conjunctural 
rassemblement of the power bloc as different social forces sought different routes out 
of an economic stalemate and organic crisis of British society. This is reminiscent of 
the remarks of Marx and Gramsci on Bonapartist moments: 
 
Alle Klassen und Parteien hatten sich während der Junitage zur Partei der 
Ordnung vereint gegenüber der proletarischen Klasse, als der Partei der 
Anarchie, des Sozialismus, des Kommunismus. Sie hatten die Gesellschaft 
„gerettet" gegen „die Feinde der Gesellschaft". Sie hatten die Stichworte der 
alten Gesellschaft, „Eigentum, Familie, Religion, Ordnung", als Parole unter ihr 
Heer ausgeteilt (Marx: 18B: S. 123) 
 
The passage of the troops of many different parties under the banner of a 
single party, which better represents and resumes the needs of the entire 
class, is an organic and normal phenomenon, even if its rhythm is very swift 
indeed almost like lightning in comparison with periods of calm. It represents 
the fusion of an entire social class under a single leadership, which alone is 
held to be capable of solving an overriding problem of its existence and of 
fending off a mortal danger [Q13 §23, S. 1604). 
 
In short, Mrs Thatcher’s Conservative party mobilized a new cross-class alliance 
against those identified with the post-war social democratic settlement and its alleged 
failures. In particular, it attacked the enemy within – organized labour. We might 
describe her Stichworte as „Eigentum, Familie, Marktwirtschaft, »Law and Order«”. 
 
While Margaret Thatcher was no Napoleon I or Winston Churchill; was she a Louis 
Bonaparte? She was the first woman to become prime minister in Britain; had a 
domineering personality; adopted a ‘conviction politics’ approach to campaigning, and 
party leadership, won an unprecedented three successive election victories; and 
exploited more fully than most the powers available to the premier in Britain’s unique 
form of unwritten ‘elected dictatorship’ in a highly mediatised age. 
 
Following Marx’s approach to periodization we can distinguish several periods of the 
neoliberal regime shift that was introduced by Mrs Thatcher and survives to the 
present. For the moment, let mention: (1) the pre-history of Thatcherism up to the 
‘point of no return’; (2) an initial period of consolidation when the institutional 
framework and compromises associated with Britain’s post-war settlement were rolled 
back in the name of the free economy and strong state; (3) a consolidated period when 
the neoliberal policy approach was rolled forward, in a more radical, confident manner 
relying on Mrs Thatcher’s personal [Bonapartist] qualities and the potential for elected 
dictatorship inscribed in Britain’s flexible, unwritten Constitution; (4) a period of 
‘blowback’ when negative economic, social, and political trends began to accumulate 
and resistance mounted to the roll-forward phase – these led to an internal party coup 
against Mrs Thatcher, triggered by domestic failures (notably the “Poll Tax”) and 
divisions over Europe. A fifth period followed under the “steadying hand” of the new 
and remarkably uncharismatic Conservative Premier, John Major. This provided 
relative political stabilization and normalized the neo-liberal legacies of the third and 
fourth periods. I discuss further periods in later sections. 
 
The party coup against Margaret Thatcher’s leadership of the Conservative Party 
ended the domineering approach of the ‘Iron Lady’ and a conviction politics that had 
begun to overlook the need for managing parliament, press, and people. It did not end 
the social bases of support for the Thatcherite project or reverse its legacies. Support 
initially stemmed from Margaret Thatcher’s ability to express hitherto unvoiced petty 
bourgeois discontent with the post-war settlement and exploit disillusion with the 
Labour government, the unions, and visible economic decline. Moreover, from 
Thatcher’s first days in opposition almost to her final days in Downing Street, the press 
was overwhelmingly supportive. However, pace Stuart Hall et al. (1978), the 
authoritarian populist appeal of Mrs Thatcher and her Thatcherite colleagues and 
media supporters was less important to the long-run resilience of Thatcherism than its 
ability to consolidate institutional power through control of a centralized state and to 
engage in a war of position with a view to modifying the structural balance of power in 
state-economy-society relations. While measures to promote popular capitalism were 
part of the authoritarian populist moment of Thatcherism, there was also an 
authoritarian statist moment that strengthened the state and initiated draconian 
reductions in civil liberties. These are typical Bonapartist features. 
 
Moreover, the neoliberal policies pursued by the Thatcher government and its 
successors reinforced de-industrialization and, where core industries survived, 
contributed to their splitting up among rival foreign capitals. Without the economic, 
political, and social bases for a concerted national economic strategy, Britain’s 
economic fortunes came to depend heavily on the vagaries of finance-dominated 
accumulation and the wider world market and a low-skill, low-tech, low-wage, and 
even zero-hour service sector associated with a neoliberal race to the bottom. 
Neoliberal policies and public investment decisions (including the regional allocation 
of infrastructure projects) also intensified uneven development to the benefit of London 
and the rest of the South-East. 
 
Tony Blair and the ‘New Labour’ Project 
 
Tony Blair’s New Labour initiative was a weak version of Margaret Thatcher’s 
Bonapartism. But it would be misleading to equate him with Louis Bonaparte and the 
Iron Lady with Napoleon Bonaparte. In each case, their coups were not military but 
party-political. And they were both intended to reorder the state and its relation to the 
market economy and civil society along neoliberal lines. Thus New Labour marked a 
sixth period of authoritarian neoliberalism. The fifth period had normalized 
neoliberalism and secured relative political stability – although membership of the 
European Union still seriously divided the Conservative Party. However, resistance to 
neoliberalism was growing and its economic and political failures and damage to social 
cohesion were becoming ever more evident. Rather than providing an innovative ‘third 
way’ between neoliberalism and socialism, however, Blair’s historic mission was quite 
different. As Marx noted, it is important to distinguish the '"so-called" people's party' 
from a real people's party (18B: 55). For, in historical conflicts, one must ‘distinguish 
between the fine words and aspirations of the parties and their real organisation and 
their real interests, their image from their reality' (18B: 56). Just as Louis Bonaparte 
had discovered the limits to the Herrschaft der Prätorianer and needed to rebuild the 
links between state and bourgeois civil society, Blair recognized the need to retreat 
from radical neoliberalism and rebuild the links between the authoritarian neo-
liberalism state and bourgeois civil society. This reflected the kind of conjuncture 
described by Gramsci as ‘a static equilibrium’ in which neither the conservatives nor 
the progressives have the strength for victory – the progressive forces lack maturity 
and even the conservative group needs a master (Q13, §23*, S. 1604). Tony Blair was 
that master. He demobilized progressive forces and provided the missing leadership 
for conservative forces. 
 
What distinguished New Labour’s approach from earlier periods was the political and 
social necessity in this static equilibrium to provide ‘Third Way’ flanking and supporting 
measures to keep the neo-liberal show on the road. This practical necessity was not 
confined to Britain but was part of the continuing reinvention of neoliberalism. But the 
Third Way had a distinctive British inflection because of the distinctive legacies of 
Labour politics, the growing North-South divided, and the importance of Labour’s 
northern heartlands to its electoral success even as New Labour grew more 
metropolitan. The main break with the broader strategic line of Thatcherism concerned 
its hegemonic vision more than its state project. Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (his 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and, later, his successor as PM), supported a more ‘one 
nation’ social imaginary over the Thatcherite ‘two nations’ approach. But this ‘nation’ 
would not be re-unified under the protection of the Keynesian welfare national state. 
Instead social cohesion would be secured mainly through labour market attachment 
(i.e., workfare, not welfare) and the regeneration of marginalized communities. In 
addition, individual, family, and child poverty would be alleviated mainly through a 
series of 'stealthy' (rather than proudly proclaimed) and targeted measures to redirect 
welfare spending within otherwise rigid fisco-financial parameters. This conformed 
with, rather than challenging, the profit-oriented, market-mediated logic of neo-
liberalism. In short, New Labour administered the legacies of Thatcherism as so many 
economically or politically irreversible faits accomplis. Thus, their pathologies 
continued to accumulate beneath the political surface and representational and 
political crises continued to develop – met with increasing centralization of power 
within the Labour Government, Parliamentary Party, and its national organs. In 
addition, New Labour policies reinforced previous trends towards financialization and 
finance-dominated accumulation. 
 
The bell tolled for New Labour when the North Atlantic Financial Crisis erupted in 2007-
2008. The measures it took to bail out the financial sector transformed a financial crisis 
into a fiscal crisis marked by rising public sector deficits that were ruthlessly exploited 
by the Conservative Party, the City of London, and right-wing press to discredit New 
Labour’s hard-won reputation for economic competence. It also provided the excuse 
to move beyond the politics of austerity towards a ‘state of enduring austerity’. This 
conjuncture was another threat to the rule of capital and another an opportunity to 
renew the neoliberal project. Responding to this Vielfachkrise, there was another 
rassemblement of economic and political forces to defend neoliberalism and roll it 
forward again – a phase in class struggle that can be called radical Thatcherism redux. 
The General Election in 2010 led to a coalition government comprising a large 
Conservative majority and support from the Liberal Democrats. This used the crisis as 
an opportunity to make further inroads into what remained of the institutions that 
embodied the post-war settlement. This politics of austerity was more and more 
translated into the consolidation of an enduring austerity state and the growing 
polarization and precarization of the population. This was the economic and political 
background for the historic Brexit referendum. 
 
Brexit as a Symbolic Bonaparte 
 
There is a key difference between the conjuncture that enabled the rise of Thatcherism 
and the conjuncture in which the Brexit vote occurred. The organic crisis of post-war 
Fordism created the rassemblement of the establishment around a Louis Bonapartist 
Thatcher. Her regime could then exploit the potential for an elected dictatorship 
backed by plebiscitary elections that won key sections of the middle and working 
classes with the vehement support of the press (for a good recent analysis of the 
resulting class offensive, see Gallas, 2016). In contrast, the Brexit conjuncture 
reflected a long-running split in the establishment around Europe, increasing hostility 
to finance capital, a growing crisis of authority for political elites, a legitimacy crisis of 
the state, a worsening representational crisis in the party system, and an organic crisis 
in the wider society. Specifically, we can note: 
 
1) Entry into and continued membership of the EU have proved a neuralgic point 
in British politics from the 1950s onward. The European question has divided people 
nostalgic for empire, nationalists, Atlanticists, Europeanists, and globalists in different 
ways at different times. Many of those involved in these debates relied on ill-informed 
nostalgia for a British imperial past and ‘weltgeschichtlichen Rückerinnerungen’ and 
took ‘ihre Poesie … aus der Vergangenheit’ (18B: S. 117). 
 
2) The loss of respect for the ruling classes (e.g. for corruption, cronyism, sleaze) 
and a loss in confidence among the ruling classes, enabled the disgruntled masses to 
enter politics as an autonomous (but fragmented) force, moving from passivity to 
making radical demands for change that were countered by populist appeals.  
 
3) A legitimacy crisis as successive neoliberal projects failed to deliver nationwide 
prosperity and, in addition, created conditions for the fisco-financial crisis and austerity 
when the North Atlantic Financial Crisis erupted. 
 
4) A growing disconnection between the natural governing parties in Westminster, 
their members and their voters. This representational crisis was reflected in support 
for Scottish Nationalism and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). 
 
5) A wider organic crisis in the social order, reflected in contestation over ‘British 
values’, disputed national and regional identities, north-south and other regional 
divides, the metropolitan orientation of intellectual strata, and generational splits. 
 
6) An economic and financial crisis in the European Union, notably in the Eurozone, 
an intensifying democratic deficit in its political institutions, the hegemony of Germany 
in Northern Europe and its domination over Southern Europe, the economic migration 
and refugee crises, and, beyond Europe, the shift of the global centre of economic 
gravity to East Asia. These crisis-tendencies reinforced the view that British 
sovereignty and the United Kingdom’s freedom to trade globally was being sacrificed 
to European political institutions. 
 
Like Louis Bonaparte, Brexit was a floating signifier. Marx argued in Die 
Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, 1848 bis 1850: »der einfältigste Mann Frankreichs die 
vielfältigste Bedeutung erhielt. Eben weil er nichts war, konnte er alles bedeuten, nur 
nicht sich selbst. So verschieden indessen der Sinn des Namens Napoleon im Munde 
der verschiedenen Klassen sein mochte, jede schrieb mit diesem Namen auf ihr 
Bulletin: Nieder mit der Partei des „National", nieder mit Cavaignac, nieder mit der 
Konstituante, nieder mit der Bourgeoisrepublik« (MEW 7, S 45). In other words, 
different forces could project their own hopes and fears onto Bonaparte; he in turn 
skilfully manipulated and exploited this polyvalence to advance his own interests. The 
same is true of Brexit. Leaving the European Union was the “simplest” solution to 
Britain’s problems and acquired the most varied meanings. Moreover, like the pure 
republican factor in the French parliament, which had no firm foundations in the social 
relations of production, but was »eine Koterie« of heterogeneous individuals and social 
categories, unified above all by »französischen Nationalismus … Haß gegen die 
Wiener Verträge und gegen die Allianz mit England« (18B: S. 124). In the case of the 
Brexiteers, there is a similar coterie of ‘Tory backwoodsmen’ (reactionary 
representatives from rural counties), little Englanders (isolationists), free traders, 
independent entrepreneurs, press barons, and others, unified by their hatred against 
the European treaties and the power of Germany. 
 
These and other factors led David Cameron, the Conservative Party leader and Prime 
Minister, into errors of judgement in an attempt to defuse internal party dissent and 
undermine popular support for UKIP, exposing his party (and the country) to ‘an 
uncertain future by demagogic promises’ (Q13§23: 1603). This was a symptom of the 
political paralysis born of parliamentary cretinism and the fetishism of a misinformed, 
misguided plebiscite. »Der parlamentarische Kretinismus, der die Angesteckten in 
eine eingebildete Welt festbannt und ihnen allen Sinn, alle Erinnerung, alles 
Verständnis für die rauhe Außenwelt raubt, dieser parlamentarische Kretinismus 
gehörte dazu, wenn sie, die alle Bedingungen der parlamentarischen Macht mit eignen 
Händen zerstört hatten und in ihrem Kampfe mit den andern Klassen zerstören 
mußten, ihre parlamentarischen Siege noch für Siege hielten und den Präsidenten zu 
treffen glaubten, indem sie auf seine Minister schlugen (18B: S. 173) 
 
Cameron did not expect to have to fulfil his promises — initially because he did not 
anticipate winning a parliamentary majority (with the result that the Liberal Democrats 
would have vetoed the referendum). Thus the clear Conservative victory in the 2015 
general election was the immediate context for the tragi-comedy of errors played out 
in the referendum and thereafter. Even then, Cameron thought he could persuade 
voters to confirm British membership of the European Union through the same tactics 
as used in the referendum on Scottish independence: campaigning on a politics of 
fear. The problem with this tactic was that the power bloc had lost control over public 
opinion, the hinge between political and civil society, regarding the European Union. 
This reflected decades-long hostility from what became a vehemently and highly 
focused pro-Brexit press. This accounted for 82% of hard copy and on-line newspaper 
readers and it would normally support the Conservative party in elections even when 
positioning itself to the right at other times. This vehemence remains. Another key 
factor in swinging public opinion in these uncertain times was the alliance of those 
‘charismatic men of destiny’, Nigel Farage (populist leader of UKIP) and Boris Johnson 
(the high-profile Conservative Mayor of London) (cf. Q13§23: 1603). 
 
An interesting aspect of this Bonapartism without a Bonaparte is that Brexit has 
acquired its own erroneous and erratic momentum even under – or perhaps because 
of – the weak and fragile leadership of Mrs Theresa May. Cameron called the 
referendum for internal party reasons, lost it (he was a Remainer), and promptly 
resigned; Boris Johnson, the charismatic figurehead crucial to the Brexit victory, who 
had vacillated about which side to support to further his political ambitions, failed to 
replace him as Prime Minister (although he remains a key force pushing for a ‘hard 
Brexit” or, even, a “No Deal Brexit”, which would require Britain to trade on WTO 
terms); Nigel Farage declared that his mission had been accomplished and resigned 
as leader of UKIP (but still waits in the wings of the political scene); and Theresa May 
(who backed remain) is now a prisoner of the Brexiteers in her own party and the pro-
Brexit press, growing visibly weaker by the day [at the time of writing, mid-November 
2017]. The floating signifier has acquired a supernatural political force even as 
Brexiteers and Remainers fight over how to translate it into a material reality. This 
supernatural political force is grounded in a fetishized view of the Brexit referendum 
as a democratic decision of the electorate that must be respected, regardless of the 
narrow victory in a badly framed and misinformed vote and regardless of the 
constitutional norm that the Crown-in-Parliament and not the electorate is the locus of 
sovereignty. In addition, Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty allows for a request to leave 
the European Union to be withdrawn or for the negotiation period to be extended. Like 
Mussolini, whom Gramsci compared to ‘the sorcerer’s apprentice who has learnt the 
formula to call up the devil but does not know the one to send him back to hell again’, 
politicians on both sides have conjured up forces they cannot control (Gramsci 1921). 
Thus, in contrast to the Bonapartisms of Napoleon I and his nephew or Mrs Thatcher 
and her adoptive nephew, which had clear economic foundations, wider political 
functions, and a plausible ‘modernising’ mission, Brexit is grounded in a chronic 
economic crisis, an organic crisis of the state, and a nostalgic mission to make Britain 
great again. 
 
Brexit and the Continuing Organic Crisis of the British State 
 
The UK government invoked Article 50 on 29 March 2017 to initiate negotiations about 
leaving the EU. Since then, capitalist circles continue to express worries about the 
impact of a hard Brexit (and even a soft Brexit), the Conservative Party remains divided 
on the right approach to Brexit, the population remains polarized, and the state is ill-
prepared for the negotiations. It is increasingly evident that there are many worrisome 
dilemmas and ‘wicked problems’ involved in negotiating Brexit with the European 
Union and the other 27 member-states, delivering what its advocates promised and 
pro-Brexit voters expected, maintaining government unity and popular legitimacy, and 
ensuring a smooth transition and nationwide prosperity. Many member states and 
leading Eurocrats oppose special deals lest this encourage others to consider their 
own versions of Brexit. Some also resent the UK government’s continuing special 
pleading, ambivalence, and sheer incoherence. 
 
The choice posed in the referendum was misleading: the real choice should have been 
in or out of neoliberalism rather than in or out of the European Union. A key part of the 
popular discontent that led to the Brexit vote outcome had to do with the impact of 
neoliberal policies on the expansion of the precariat, uneven regional development, 
housing shortages, and a chronic crisis in the health service. The crucial issue that 
remained largely unvoiced in the referendum debate was that real or imagined crisis 
symptoms were not caused by membership of the European Union as such. Rather, 
they were rooted in its neoliberal form, the mobility of capital rather than labour, the 
crisis of Eurozone crisis-management, and the long-run failure to address crucial 
domestic issues that undermined economic and extra-economic competitiveness. Yet 
a choice for entry or exit would not affect the overall dominance of neoliberalism—only 
its specific form and mediations. A remain vote would have consolidated an 
authoritarian neoliberal Conservative regime committed to enduring austerity. Yet 
austerity is also being entrenched in preparation for potential shocks from Brexit and 
as part of the renewed commitment to reducing government debt. Paradoxically, 
whereas the Brexit vote did not pose these questions, the 2017 general election 
campaign did put them on the political agenda. The outcome of that vote deprived Mrs 
May’s of her power to provide ‘strong and stable leadership’ to deliver a good Brexit. 
 
However, because “Brexit means Brexit”, a yes vote offered a leap into an unknown 
future. Success in the campaign seems to have turned on the demand to “take back 
control” of Britain’s future. But this errs on three grounds. First, it referenced the loss 
of formal juridico-political (territorial) sovereignty to some supranational authority – not 
the need to regain temporal sovereignty in the face of superfast, hyper-mobile financial 
capital and predatory productive capital. “Remain and reform” might have offered a 
better solution to this loss of sovereignty – if the power of transnational capital inside 
the European Union can still be challenged. Second, the loss of sovereignty is 
grounded in the increasing integration of the world market and the dominance of 
transnational capital in the networked space of flows rather than in inter-state relations. 
This has territorial dimensions but many other spatio-temporal moments that Brexit 
cannot address. And, third, paradoxically, the UK government is now even more likely 
to sign “free trade agreements” that are, in fact, more concerned with consolidating 
the power of transnational capital vis-à-vis local, regional, national states (and the EU) 
in disputes over trade or other government policies that might impact their profits. This 
is not a route to ‘taking back control’. 
 
The organic crisis of the British state has prevented the ruling class and governing 
elites from formulating a coherent strategy to defend the interests of dominant fractions 
of national and transnational capital while keeping a divided public content with the 
speed and outcome of Brexit negotiations. It has lost the ability to “reabsorb the control 
that was slipping from its grasp” (Q13 §23, S. 1603). The European Union has 
prepared a tough negotiating position and insists on securing agreement on the 
‘divorce’, citizens’ rights, and the Irish Border before post-Brexit trade arrangements 
can be discussed. Future trade arrangements and the length of any transition period 
will take much longer to settle, both in procedural terms and in terms of their practical 
complexity. 40 years’ membership of the European Union, decades of neoliberal 
slimming down of the state, lack of consensus within the Cabinet, and divergent 
interests in the key parts of the state apparatus have left the government and state ill-
equipped to negotiate and then implement new treaties and trade agreements (Rutter 
and McRae 2016). There are also growing concerns that the time and resources 
needed to negotiate Brexit will mean that many other urgent and longer-term problems 
will be neglected for two years or more. 
 
The representational crises that contribute to Britain’s organic crisis have been 
exacerbated by the Brexit vote. This can be seen in the Conservative Party itself, with 
bitter divisions between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexiteers as well as a rump of hard-line 
remainers who have promised unrelenting opposition; these divisions also separate 
those who wish to prioritize immigration and opt for free trade deals around the world 
and those who want to remain in the single market at the cost of accepting free 
movement of labour. There is also a toxic split between the Blairite rump of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party and the wider party membership, which has several 
features of a social movement rather than a natural governing party. The 
organizational crisis in UKIP leaves it unable to reposition itself to capture northern 
working-class votes, especially when it loses its place inside the European Parliament 
and wider European Union. And, as noted, there are struggles between rival 
tendencies and parties in Scotland over its status in the UK and Europe; and, in 
Ireland, over the status of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. 
 
The legitimacy crisis is also still present and could worsen if public opinion, spurred on 
by the pro-Brexit press, becomes dissatisfied with progress and suspects a deliberate 
policy of backsliding on the part of government. There are growing signs of public 
discontent with the impact of austerity and these were especially evident during the 
2017 general election campaign. In any event, the difficulties of negotiating Brexit will 
confirm the strategic incapacities of the political system. Indeed, Brexit appears to be 
a continuation of the organic crisis of the British state by other means. 
 
The Eighteenth Brumaire Today 
 
The Class Struggles in France, The Eighteenth Brumaire, and the reflections on the 
Civil War in France are three crucial texts – supported by Marx’s other writings on 
France – are unsurpassed examples of his materialist interpretation of history. They 
are more than a “first rough draft of history”, as journalism has been described; they 
are sophisticated structural and conjunctural analyses of specific periods in French 
and international economic, political and social developments that can provide us with 
powerful heuristic insights into how to research past and present history and draw 
important political lessons. Inspired by Marx’s work, Gramsci offered further 
refinements and developed a useful taxonomy of progressive and regressive forms of 
Bonapartism and Caesarism. In both cases we are offered theoretical insights into how 
to explain and interpret the complex, often disjointed, connections economic 
structures, the political terrain, the changing political scene, the shifting balance of 
forces, the miscalculations and unforced errors of political parties and social 
movements, and the crucial role of political imaginaries (including political illusions and 
delusions). Thereby Marx and Gramsci contribute to a critique of political semiosis as 
well as political economy. While the Eighteenth Brumaire is most associated with 
Marx’s analysis of the coups d’état of uncle and nephew (and the contrasts between 
them), it offers far more than this theoretically and politically. The Bonapartist 
conjuncture is a small but invaluable aspect of the broader project. It is more important 
to develop the project than to search for historical analogies – and, where these exist, 
they must be analysed in their own terms rather than as further repetitions, tragic or 
farcical, of some historical prototype. 
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